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Some contrasts between civilian and military facility
sources of military dependent outpatient medical care
sectors of the Uniformed Services Health Benefits Program
system are examined. Decreasing the proportion of patient
utilization of civilian sources is selected as a system
improvement, and increasing military physician accession
and retention is seen as a necessary adjunct. Preference
as expressed in choice behavior is identified as the
proximate mechanism in present utilization patterns and is
suggested as a predictor for utilization patterns under
alternative policies. A method for assessing preference
predictions is proposed and selection of an optimal policy
discussed. The procedures developed have continuing
applicability for policy selection to meet other goals.
Policies that improve the system are seen to have applicabil-
ity to the current problems in medical care delivery systems
at the national level.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Medical care for dependents of military personnel can be
considered to be a support function funded by the Department
of Defense. As support costs appear to rise In proportion
of total military expenditures, additional pressure is felt
to Increase the efficiency, decrease the cost, or both, of
support systems [Binkin, 1972]. In addition, major concern
is expressed daily at the increasing cost of and public
dissatisfaction with medical care in general in the United
States [Schultze, and others, 1972], Hospitals and hospital-
ization have been the focus of most studies and concerns
[Feldstein, 1971; USDHEW, 1970; etc], probably since costs
have risen most dramatically here. Analyses of outpatient
care systems have not appeared with anywhere near the fre-
quency of those considering inpatient care systems, possibly
because of a general paucity of meaningful data [White, 1973]
although a shift in resources from inpatient care to out-
patient care is often mentioned as the means of improving
the effectiveness of medical care delivery at all levels
[White, 1973; Wienerman, 1961; Feldstein, 1973; Knowles,
1973; Saward and Greenlick, 1972].
Recently the Navy's medical care facilities have been
reorganized into Navy Regional Medical Centers (NRMC)
consisting usually of a large hospital with comprehensive
clinical facilities, some smaller and satellite dispensaries
at nearby Naval activities, some of which are large enough

to operate limited specialty clinics. Thus all levels of
military medical care are represented in an administratively
unified system. The military facilities provide part of the
outpatient care and most of the inpatient care for military
dependents under the Uniformed Services Health Benefits
Program (USHBP); the remainder of medical care for military
dependents is provided for under the Civilian Health and
Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) as
authorized by congress. USHBP is also considered a system
defined by common funding and potential users. Dependents
of military personnel are free to choose to utilize either
military or CHAMPUS-funded medical care sources for each
occasion of medical care service.
Choice is seen as the proximate mechanism of operation
of the USHBP outpatient care system, at least insofar as the
allocation of monetary resources between the civilian and
military medical sectors is concerned. Further, choice is
considered to be a proximate determinant of the continuing
capability of the military medical sector to meet the demands
placed on it by controlling the number of military physicians
who enter and remain in military service. As these two
factors (proportion of utilization of the military medical
care sector by patients and military physician retention)
are fundamental parameters of the cost and effectiveness of
the USHBP outpatient care system, any efforts toward
improving the system must treat with them. Thus patient and
physician preferences may be given central importance.

Many of the ideas expressed here were encountered or
formulated during an experience tour at the Navy Regional
Medical Center, Oakland, California, May and June 1973.
Statements marked with an asterisk (*) are attributed to
the medical and administrative staffs, and were gathered
during interviews and discussions.

II. THE PRESENT SYSTEM
A. DESCRIPTIVE MODEL
1. System Operation
In day-to-day operation, the system manifests
itself as the movement of persons seeking medical services
among medical facilities of various kinds. The persons
providing the services are shown as part of the facilities.
Military dependents seeking medical services will be called
patients; providers of medical assistance will be called
physicians. Changes in the use of paramedical personnel
either to increase the effectiveness of physicians employed
or to act in a flow regulating capacity [Garfield, in Chacko,
1971] are not discussed. Several pilot programs are now in
effect to test the practicability of utilizing paramedical
personnel in a role of increased responsibility. It is felt
that successful expansion of these programs will probably
have beneficial effects on the objectives Independent of the
policy choice considerations to be discussed. DPAR refers
to dependent population at risk, the patient source.
Dissatisfaction has been expressed (for example at
Oakland MRMC) at the existence of patient movements between
primary care sources in the course of seeking the solution
of a particular medical service (especially route 2b) and
what is deemed excessive use of routes la, 2a, 2b instead

of routes A and B; i.e. primary care sources tend to function
as referral services in excess and are deficient in actual



































2. Physician Accession and Employment
Difficulty has been encountered in providing suffi-
cient numbers of physicians to provide primary care in
dispensaries and General Practice clinics, for example
during the summer of 1973 at Oakland Navy Regional Medical
Center, and during the fall of 1973 at the Naval Postgraduate
School Dispensary. Thus the actual provision of services is
not well represented as a fixed facility. A partial chart








Of interest are: routes that cross from above the
broken line to below it (accessions to military medical
service) routes that remain below the broken line (retentions)
and routes that cross the broken line from below to above
(losses by military medical service).
B. THE OBJECTIVE AND ASSUMPTIONS
1. Utilization of CHAMPUS and Military Medical Sources:
The Problem
Both CHAMPUS disbursements and all operating costs
of a Navy Regional Medical Center (including outlying dis-
pensaries) come out of a fixed budget. (*) CHAMPUS disburse-
ments may account for more than half of the total budget
allocation (for example at Oakland NRMC in FY 72, as reported
by the Administrative staff). CHAMPUS is "open-ended"; that
is, there is essentially no restriction on the number of
services a patient may elect, and the CHAMPUS disbursement
for each service is fixed by the local CHAMPUS administrative
agency (Blue Cross, in California) . Thus heavy utilization
of CHAMPUS sources of care by patients reduces funds available
for military facility operations in an essentially uncontrol-
lable fashion. No present means exist to reduce the incidence
of CHAMPUS utilization except to provide what would be
perceived by patients as superior medical services In the
military facilities. The patient may commonly lump these
obstacles under the descriptions "inconvenience" and
"indifference." Although the patient must pay at least $50.00
per year plus 2052 of the service fee to utilize CHAMPUS
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sources, he evidently often perceives it to be worth the
cost to avoid the inconvenience and indifference.
2. Provision of Services
A general desire to avoid serving in a primary care
capacity was perceived to exist among staff at the Oakland
NRMC (among other places). It was difficult to determine
whether this was a cause or an effect of the usual practice
of assigning nearly all non-career medical officers designa-
tions as General Medical Officers (GMO) and utilizing them
in primary care billets. The results were low retention of
physicians serving in a full-time primary care capacity and
insufficient numbers of physicians serving in this capacity,
leading to excessive patient waiting times and a strong
tendency towards hasty service and excessive numbers of
unnecessary referrals to specialty clinics. (*) To summarize,
the problem is to find means to attract patients away from
CHAMPUS medical care sources by providing medical care
services at military facilities that are perceived by
patients to have net superiority in quality. The major
accompanying problem is to attract, retain, and organize
sufficient numbers of military physicians to provide these
preferred primary medical care services. In terms of
optimization, the objectives are the proportion of total
USHBP services performed in military facilities, and the
availability of military physicians to perform those services.
The problem is to choose a policy alternative most likely to




(a) The CHAMPUS program will continue to be
available In its present form.
(b) The marginal cost of providing increased levels
of military medical services will be no more than the
CHAMPUS disbursement for the equivalent services provided
by civilian sources. (Note that this need not be an assump-
tion; it is commonly considered to be fact among knowledge-
able Medical Service Corps Officers queried at Oakland NRMC.
However, a specific investigation is outside the scope of
this thesis.)
(c) The present NRMC command and administrative
structure will continue in effect.
(d) The budgeting concept and procedure for medical
services will remain in effect and will not experience sub-
stantial increases or decreases in size.
(e) Implementation of a National Health Insurance
Plan and trends toward increasing control of cost and methods
of practice in the civilian sector will not lead to full-
time contract of civilian sources to provide military medical
care, and military medical facilities will remain under
direct military control.
(f) It is desirable to decrease CHAMPUS utilization
and increase military medical facility usage proportionately.
(This is equivalent to assuming that the problem as stated
is valid. This further assumes that there are no unknown
but compelling reasons that override the justifications for
1H

the statement and interpretation of the objective and that
the desired increase in physician retention can be accomp-
lished without exceeding relevant manpower ceilings. That
the objective is valid is supported by the Commanding Officer,
Oakland Navy Regional Medical Center and his staff, (May
1973); however it is imagined that legislative authorities
might feel otherwise.)
(g) Family Practice residencies can be established
in NRMC and the existing trend toward increasing numbers of
medical school graduates desiring careers in Family Practice
medicine will continue [Los Angeles Times News Service,
3 February 1974]
.
C. SOME RELEVANT CONTRASTS IN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY
MEDICAL CARE SECTORS
1. Contrasts in CHAMPUS and Military Medical Care
(a) Inconvenience and long waits: civilian sources
invariably utilize an appointment system while military
sources often utilize queueing as a patient flow scheme,
without appointments.
(b) Choice of physician and continuity: the
patient is free to choose his physician under CHAMPUS. In
a military facility, he often has only the choice of seeing
the physician on duty. Thus repeat visits for further
treatment are not necessarily to the same physician.
(c) Availability of care (emergency): CHAMPUS
sources can usually be contacted directly by patients during
off-hours and the patient can usually arrange to meet his
15

physician in the physician's office if the situation warrants
it. Patients usually find it very difficult to reach the
military physician on call during off-hours; the patient has
no choice of whom he may eventually reach, and may have to
resort to use of the nearest military hospital emergency
room, usually with its very long queues.
(d) Preventive medicine: CHAMPUS does not reimburse
costs of preventive medical services. But military facilities
do not offer preventive medical services to dependents except
in the form of "well-baby clinic", annual pap smears, and
pelvic examination for female dependents.
(e) Costs: CHAMPUS co-payments consist in the first
$50.00 per individual or $100.00 per family each fiscal year
plus 20$ or 25$ of "allowed" fees. Military facility out-
patient care is free of direct charge although it might be
argued that there are other economic costs that are sub-
stantial (excessive waits [Campbell, 1971; Whipple, 197*0;
the perception of inferior services; baby-sitting fees, as
well children are not allowed to accompany parents, etc.) .
2. Contrasts in Civilian and Military Physician
Employment
(a) Pay systems and stability (fee-for-service
versus salary): military pays to physicians (including
continuation pays) are usually somewhat lower than for
comparable salaried civilian positions, and may be substan-
tially lower than remuneration in a fee-for-service practice.
However fee-for-service net remuneration to a physician is
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frequently lower than salary for comparable civilian positions
[Roemer, 1962]. The salary does represent much more secure
and stable an income. Present trends indicate a steady rise
in the proportion of physicians in the United States who are
salaried [Harris, 1964].
(b) Continuity of care: the civilian physician is
usually kept informed of his patient's progress and can
continue to participate in his health care in the event of
referrals or hospitalization. This is seldom the case in
NRMC.
(c) Workload and hours; emergency calls: the
civilian physician usually works longer hours (approximately
in proportion to his greater remuneration) than the military
physician. The military physician generally is not assigned
or associated with specific patients so that he responds to
after-hours calls only when he is assigned standby duty.
(d) Preventive medicine: the military physician
provides some preventive medical services to active duty
military personnel, but it is not integrated into an ongoing
program of health maintenance. The civilian physician
generally does not have patients motivated to pay for such
a program of health maintenance except when both are members
of a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) such as Kaiser-
Permanente or the Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York
(HIP).
(e) Specialization Opportunities: the military
physician enjoys at least as great an opportunity for
17

specialist training (residency) as his civilian counterpart
and is usually much better remunerated during it. (*)
However the military physician probably has less choice of
which specialty to train for.
(f) Choice of domicile, family separation: the
military physician may be subject to transfers and change
of domicile every few years, and although he may have
relatively free choice among duty stations, the alternatives
available are limited to military facility locations.
Further, occasional tours of sea duty cause a few physicians
in the military services to be absent from their families
for extended periods.
(g) Professional freedom: the military physician
enjoys about the same level of professional freedom as any
member of a large group practice (*) (although this may be
hotly contested) . The review boards and other professional
constraints that are likely eventually to follow National
Health Insurance implementation will almost surely mean that
the military physician enjoys at least as much professional
freedom as he would in any civilian practice.
(h) Administrative burden: on balance the military
physician is required to perform less record keeping and
other paperwork than his civilian counterpart, especially
with the growth of civilian and government health insurance
coverage and its administrative requirements.
(i) Required occasional assignment in a primary
care capacity: the military physician who retains his
18

designation as a GMO will almost certainly serve in a
primary care capacity during his entire career; the military
physician who specializes provides primary care only when
the referral system is abused by overburdened GMOs or on a
part-time basis during shortages of GMOs. The civilian
physician is in somewhat the same position except that if
he specializes he may elect not to act in a primary care
capacity at all.
3. Other Attributes
Several other possibilities present themselves which
are not considered relevant in direct preference assessment
because they are possible of implementation regardless of
primary care facilitative policy changes, and' their benefits




A. NATURE OF THE OBJECTIVES
In order to realize improvement in the objective, patients
and physicians must change their economic behavior in the
aggregate. Since free choice of the source of care is assumed
to continue and since physician accession and retention is
largely a matter of individual physician choice, improvement
in the objective can be accomplished only by increasing the
attractiveness of military medical care systems to patients
and physicians. Further, since the alternatives to military
medical care systems are civilian medical care systems, it
would be appropriate to examine attributes of civilian medi-
cal care systems for possible implementation in military
medical care systems to effect the desired increase in attrac-
tiveness. Finally, it would be appropriate to test attributes
not generally implemented in civilian medical care systems
which could be implemented in military medical care systems
to effect an improvement in the objectives. Any particular
combination of attributes will be called a policy.
B. INFERENCE FROM EXISTING DATA
1. CHAMPUS Data
The data recorded consist primarily in utilization
and cost information. Included are patient address, sponsor
duty station (where, presumably, military medical facilities




care, kind of service provided and charges allowed. Not
included are actual costs to patient if the source of care
is a "non-participant" (i.e. does not adhere to the fee
schedule specified by the fiscal agency for reimbursement
computation), why the patient chose CHAMPUS over military
facilities, and the type of organization of the source of
care (solo, small groups, clinic, or HMO). Because of
highly variable delays encountered in processing CHAMPUS
claims, there may be substantial inaccuracies in summaries
over short time spans. Further, little information is avail-
able concerning the patients' frequency of use of military
medical care facilities and referrals to other civilian or
military medical care sources.
2. Military Facilities Utilization
These data consist directly in utilization informa-
tion. Cost data are not based on charge for individual
services rendered; in fact it is difficult to impute the
proportion of facility cost allocable to a particular ser-
vice, or to determine if provision of services to military
dependents is more costly than provision of services to
military personnel. Data do not include complete referral
information (to other military or civilian facilities) or
if individual patients utilize civilian sources as well as
military sources of care, or in what proportion. Confounding
of several types occurs, as well, especially at the dispensary
level. If physicians are available for primary care duties
who have had specialty training, the incidence of service
21

related to their specialties reported by that dispensary
will tend to increase during their tours of duty (Adminis-
tration Officer, Naval Postgraduate School Dispensary, Winter
1973). After their departures, presumably the users of their
specialty services will seek the equivalent care elsewhere,
either through CHAMPUS or at another military facility. The
availability of such specialized services at the primary
care level is difficult to predict, and it tends to bias
basic data describing primary care delivery. Another type
of confounding may be described as local policy variations.
Appointment systems and their modes of operation; referral
services; resources and effort directed specifically at
dependent care; working relations with the local civilian
medical community; hours of availability of various services;
and many other factors are under the control of the facility
Senior Medical Officer. As many of the policies and effects
are implemented informally, attempting to determine the
effects of various local policies or even what some of them
were may be virtually indistinguishable from determining the
effectiveness and capability of individual Senior Medical
Officers. Such an investigation would expect to be met with
great resentment and results could quite reasonably be re-
garded as unacceptable for any further use by military
medical staffs. In short, there are no data concerning the
effects on patient choice behavior of reducing the contrasts
in attributes in CHAMPUS and military medical programs except
possibly for the effects of instituting an appointments system.
22

3. Physician Accession and Retention
These data are available primarily in gross form;
that is without identification of variables that could be
correlated with individual circumstances. Thus the effects
of local policy factors on retention cannot be determined
readily; and the relation between individual physician
opportunities for further training as a civilian or in mili-
tary medicine, or duty assignment, and his retention decision
cannot be determined. The recent existence of the "doctor
draft" confounds accession data considerably. In short, no
reliable data exist with which to predict the effects of




A particular policy is implemented presumably because
it will (or is expected to) effect some kind of improvement;
the choice of policy for implementation is presumably based
on its capability or expectation of effecting more improve-
ment than any other. In the case of USHBP competing sectors
have been identified as CHAMPUS and military medical care
facilities and improvements desired described as decreasing
CHAMPUS utilization by increasing military medical care
facilities' utilization, and Increasing military physician




Implementing various of the policies in various loca-
tions on a trial basis in order to test their relative effec-
tiveness in improving the system is not an ideal procedure.
First, the administrative turbulence and expense resulting
from transient policy implementation would be undesirable;
second, the test period would have to be on the order of
several years to begin to test the effects on physician
accession and retention; third, local effects and the knowl-
edge by participants that the policies may be transient could
be expected to confound any results. Unfortunately, so-
called experiments of nature do not exist with regard to
the policy alternatives (attribute contrasts) which are
formulated here, so that existing data can be used to pre-
dict exact future behavior of the participants in the system
only under the policies which are now in effect. The objec-
tives to be improved have been formulated in terms of aggre-
gate choice behavior. It would seem reasonable, then, to
attempt to measure the aggregate preferences of patients
and physicians for various of the policy alternatives. It
is to be expected that the feasible policy which Is somehow
most preferred both by patients and physicians will be the
policy which will result in the greatest improvement in the
objectives within existing budget constraints.
a. Contrasts In Choice Revocabillty
Some difficulty is encountered in comparing
patient and physician preferences. Patient choices are
24

frequent and repeated; a patient is not committed to make
a future choice by his previous choice. On the other hand,
the choices a physician makes that are relevant to the con-
siderations here (entry into or retention in military service)
are not repeated and are essentially irrevocable: to enter
military service or not; to remain in service or not at the
end of active obligated service. Thus in considering a
choice or predicting his preference for it, a patient has
some past experience to draw on and can always change his
mind later. The physician has neither past experience nor
the opportunity for remaking the same decision,
b. Competition for Resources
When considering the system as a whole, it
appears that the civilian sector (CHAMPUS) is competing
with military facilities for funds, patients, and physicians.
However, neither sector of the system has an identity in
terms of motivated behavior. The principals involved
(patients and physicians) are in a sense the resources being
competed for rather than being the competitors. Thus a





IV. ALTERNATIVES AND COMPARISONS
A . ALTERNATIVES
1. Technical Facilltatlve Changes
These are not policies under consideration as they
are generally agreed upon as desirable improvements indepen-
dent of direct effects on patient and physician preference
behavior; they do not represent compromise between patient
and physician desires in the aggregate, and are essentially
procedures designed to increase system efficiency. Obstacles
to implementation are variously the associated costs and
incomplete administrative control of outlying facilities in
the relatively recently-established NRMC concept.
a. Referrals
It was observed that referrals tended to be
excessive in number (that is, too many services could have
been provided at primary care levels of military medical
care facilities) and sometimes were misdirected (that is,
patients were referred from one facility to another at the
primary care level). (*) Reducing the incidence of inappro-
priate referrals is (at least in theory) possible by adminis-
trative action that may be instituted by the NRMC Commanding
Officer consisting in policy directives and to some extent,
reallocation of physician manpower to increase availability
of primary care sources. Since the various components of
the NRMC enjoyed considerable autonomy prior to organization
into a NRMC, there has been some reluctance to impose closer
26

administrative control (especially if the control concerns
modality of practice of medicine in any way). Nevertheless
the authority to effect improvements exists. (It is noted
that the CHAMPUS system effectively prevents excessive
referrals to hospitalization, as civilian hospitalization
is covered under CHAMPUS only If it is both considered
necessary by military medical authorities and is unavailable
in local military hospitals. Thus the costly abuse of
hospitalization caused by fee-for-service third-party modes
of medical care delivery noted by Roemer [1962] and others
is effectively prevented.)
b. Medical Data Systems
The present system used to store and retrieve
patient histories and treatments is awkward at best. A
number of proposals are under consideration which promise
to reduce reliance on handwritten or transcribed records
which must be retrieved from files at the patient's principal
primary care facility for use at that facility, and which
must be carried by the patient to another facility if consul-
tation or testing is required. Methods of incorporating
patient data created by civilian medical care sources into
military facility records are also under consideration.
Costs and need for hardware standardization decisions are
the obstacles to implementation. (*)
c. Casemix Planning
Feldstein [1968] developed a linear programming
algorithm for planning specialty clinic consultation periods
27

which smoothed workload in auxiliary service facilities
(laboratory; radiology; patient admitting; etc.) in the
British National Health System facilities. A "circuit rider"
visiting clinician concept has been incorporated from time
to time between NRMC central and outlying facilities. Pro-
vision of some features of preventive medical practice (such
as physical examinations) could be provided to patients
(that is, to those who are not active duty service members)
in some variation of the "Prosser plan" [TIME magazine, 11
February 197^3- Feldstein's linear programming algorithm
or the like could greatly facilitate preventive medical
practice planning, clinician visits, and so on, to avoid
cyclic overload of various types of service. The advantages
of using all available facilities to capacity are well docu-
mented and discussed in virtually every text on hospital
administration
.
2. Primary Care as a Specialty
A major deficiency in military medical care systems
is inadequate or inconvenient provision of primary care and
overemphasis of specialty care. (*); [White, 1973] This
is evidenced by: overuse of emergency room facilities at
military hospitals (*), [Strauss, 1967]; excessive queueing
times [Whipple, 197^]; heavy utilization of CHAMPUS despite
its additional cost (*); the tendency to view opportunity
for specialization as a primary military medical career
incentive to the degradation in status of the providers of
primary care (*); and so on. It has been observed that the
28

overemphasis on specialty care (and corresponding neglect
of primary care) is characteristic of American medical prac-
tice in general yet in Great Britain the reverse is true
[White, 19731. As the organization of military medical care
systems more closely resembles the British National Health
Service one could expect that the factors tending to de-
emphasize specialty care in Great Britain would do so in
military medical practice. The limiting factor in Great
Britain is number of specialty practice positions available;
a substantial majority of physicians entering American mili-
tary medical service possess some degree of qualification as
specialists. It is appropriate to conclude that military
medical practice reflects quite accurately the practice
prevalent in this country as a whole. The relative success
of Health Maintenance Organizations at shifting a large
proportion of health care expenses from inpatient and highly
specialized treatment to primary care providers [White, 1973;
Chacko, 1969; etc.] could be taken as an Incentive to mili-
tary medical care planners to emulate them. (Recent reports
have been made of trends toward critically excessive utili-
zation of these primary care sources [Garfield, in Chacko,
1971]; the solution suggested relies heavily on expansion
of the roles of paramedical personnel to include some of
the more routine functions of primary care physicians.
Strong resistance to much of this may be encountered in the
civilian medical community [Board of Medical Examiners,
State of California, 1973; White, 1973]. The existence
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of pilot programs and some past practices in military facili-
ties similar to those referred to indicates that an unique
opportunity exists in the military medical community to
develop such solutions independent of the policy choices
considered here.) The increasing numbers of medical school
graduates desiring careers in primary care medical practice
[Los Angeles Times News Service, 3 February 197^; Ebert,
19731 could promise an increase in willing providers of
primary care in military medicine if adequate inducements
were offered. Until recently, however, primary care was
generally viewed as the province of those physicians not
qualified to provide more diagnoses and treatment. (*) The
establishment of the Academy of Family Practice and develop-
ment of Family Practice residencies promises to improve the
status of the providers of primary care if only by estab-
lishing primary care as a specialty in its own right. Oppor-
tunities for recent medical school graduates in Certified
Family Practice residencies are quite limited, however [Ebert,
1973]. (Rex Whitworth, M.D., Director of Education, Nativi-
dad Medical Center, Salinas, California, has indicated that
difficulty in obtaining certification for such residency
programs, especially in the typically smaller civilian
hospitals, is a factor in this restricted opportunity.) It
is apparent that establishment of a vigorous Family Practice
residency program in military hospitals could be used as
an accession and retention inducement. Because of military
hospital size and other well-established and reputable
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military residency programs additional Family Practice
residency certifications should not be difficult to achieve.
It should be noted that the USHBP is referred to in
both its military and civilian components as "medical care
programs" rather than "health care programs". This is
because preventive medical practice is not well provided
for. It has been noted [Campbell, 1971] that in some health
care delivery systems where annual physical examinations were
provided as part of a prepaid program, the utilization rate
of physical examination services was only about 30%. The
requirement for active duty military personnel to undergo
regular physical examinations would likely influence greater
utilization by dependents if such services were made avail-
able. As preventive medical services are ostensibly funda-
mental to Family Practice medicine [Saward, 196*9] » making
preventive medical services available to dependents in mili-
tary medical facilities could be a significant inducement
to decreased utilization of CHAMPUS sources of primary care.
The idea of dealing with the family unit as a whole
is another fundamental principle of Family Practice medicine.
In order to accomplish this, it would be necessary to enable
the patient to see the same physician at each visit, thus
providing continuity of care. Technical means of providing
information feedback from specialty referrals would help
as well. An element of successful Family Practice medicine
is some sort of rapport between patient and physician [White,
1973]; it is not difficult to appreciate that it is essential
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that the patient be allowed free choice of physician to
facilitate this rapport (at least within limits of physician
availability)
.
"Indifference" has been used to describe patient
assessment of physician attitude in a number of settings
including fee-for-service group practice [Wienerman, 1968],
among salaried physicians in Health Maintenance Organizations
and prepaid group practices [Kracke, 1950; Field, 1961;
Roemer, 1962]. Thus this is probably less an inherent factor
in contrasts between CHAMPUS and military medical care
sources than might be supposed. In fact, the perception of
indifference in physicians was implied to be closely related
to the leadership efforts and morale facilitated by the
local Senior Medical Officers in dispensaries surveyed by
Capt. J. Davis, MC, USN in 1972 (Enclosure to Chief of
Medicine Memorandum to the Commanding Officer, Oakland Naval
Hospital, 4 October 1972). Thus the "human element" of the
feelings patients have about physicians is seen to be more a
matter of individual differences and (in military medical
care facilities) environment established by the Senior Medical
Officer. These local differences could even dominate any
changes in preference for military medical care sources due
to policy changes as advanced here.
Obtaining military medical services desired outside
normal working hours is a problem: the only source is
usually the emergency room of the nearest military hospital
(generally entailing several hours' wait) unless the patient
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can convince the Corpsman on duty at the dispensary that
the situation is sufficiently grave to warrant the attention
of the physician on call. The patient is not afforded the
opportunity to contact the physician directly. In contrast,
CHAMPUS medical care sources usually are available either
directly or as one of a small group (four or fewer) who
share responsibility for dealing with off-hours medical care
needs. Thus the availability of a primary care physician
known to the patient at times other than office hours Is an
advantage enjoyed primarily by the CHAMPUS user.
3. Supply and Demand of Services
USHBP can be considered to be in equilibrium; the
patients are able to secure medical care at a net cost not
usually considered unreasonable (either through CHAMPUS
co-payment or imputed costs of inconvenience); enough '.
physicians are retained in military service to operate
existing facilities; and the total costs do not exceed
budgets excessively. (*) A decrease in physician retention
would (and has) increase military facility patient inconve-
nience sufficiently to induce a higher proportion of patients
to choose CHAMPUS medical care sources (and more instances of
non-availability of hospital services would occur, with
CHAMPUS benefits extended to hospitalization). Thus the
total number of services demanded remains relatively constant
under the present choice-of-price system (*), although it is
likely that total costs would rise if there were a substantial
decrease in the number of military physicians. (The marginal
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cost to the government per patient visit of increased
CHAMPUS usage is the same as the average cost since constant
fee-for-service is the reimbursement mechanism, and admini-
strative costs to the government of CHAMPUS are proportional
to fees paid. Because of the existence of fixed costs or
overhead at military medical facilities the reduction in
costs due to a reduced number of military physicians
employed, hence fewer patient visits to military facilities,
would be less than proportional to the reduction in patient
visits, or average cost per patient visit would increase.
Despite the fact that the entire system is highly labor-
intensive [White, 1973] the fixed costs cannot be disregarded.)
Although open to some question, stated military medical
facility average costs are typically lower than comparable
civilian facilities (as for example was determined by GAO
audit of Oakland Naval Hospital, 1972). Conversely, increas-
ing the numbers of military physicians can be expected to
reduce total program cost, at least if the increase is not
large. Feldstein [1968] found that in Great Britain, the
supply elasticity of demand for medical services was about
0.9; that is, demand increased almost exactly as supply.
(Imputable queueing costs are a patient demand factor in
Great Britain.) An increase in military physician availabil-
ity would tend to reduce queueing ("Inconvenience") costs in
military facilities, and an increase in realized demand on
military facilities would be experienced. Just how much of
this utilization increase would represent a shift from
3^

CHAMPUS utilization and how much would represent increase in
total demand realization is uncertain. Because marginal
costs of CHAMPUS services would remain the same to the
patient, the utilization of CHAMPUS services would not
increase and would almost certainly decrease in favor of
military medical facilities utilization until a new imputed
queueing cost equilibrium was established. In fact, since
the initial co-payment under CHAMPUS each fiscal year is the
full fee-for-service (interpretable as a yearly start-up
cost, and fixed) it would be reasonable to expect a sharp
drop in CHAMPUS utilization at the beginning of the fiscal
year following implementation of a policy improving military
medical facilities' services, when patients would view the
marginal costs of CHAMPUS services to be very much greater
than at other times of the year. Therefore it can be
expected that any policy changes which would increase
military physician accession and retention in a manner that
enables reduction in Inconvenience costs to patients will
likely reduce USHBP total costs and almost certainly will
not increase them.
B. FUTURE PREFERENCE ASSESSMENT
In order to predict the relative effectiveness of
various policies in improving the system it will be necessary
to assess the aggregate relative preferences of patients and
physicians for them. The policy attributes have already been
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The arrows drawn indicate corresponding preference
attributes
.
1. Preference Predictions in Demand for Services
A patient reveals his preference frequently and
usually by some proportionality mechanism: i.e. an indi-
vidual is likely to utilize CHAMPUS part of the time (or
for certain services) and to utilize military medical
services the rest of the time. It would then be appropriate
to ask a patient to express his preferences in terms of the
proportion of his visits that would be to military medical
care facilities under various policy alternatives. (This is
approximately equivalent to the pi-BRLT or lottery reference




To simplify the assessment, only five proportionality
options are provided at each step. The sequence of attri-
butes listed is chosen to minimize endpoints, i.e. it would
be unlikely that choice of military physician could be
provided without instituting an appointment system; Family
Practice medicine necessitates choice of physician, and so
on.
The format of the decision tree [Raiffa, 1968] is
used with substantial modification. The usual decision tree
formulation represents a chronological sequence of choices
to be made by the preference maximizer. Each choice has
some probability distribution of outcomes, each outcome
realization with a preference associated. The decision-
maker (the preference maximizer) is presumed to find it
relatively easy to assign preference values or equivalents
to each node independent of other nodes, but finds it
relatively difficult to assign cumulative preferences along
a branch through several nodes. Thus the solution procedure
amounts to formulating a reference preference measure
incorporating willingness to accept varying risks, expressing
the decision at each node in terms of the reference measure,
and then calculating the value of each end point of the tree
in terms of the reference measure to enable direct preference
valuations so that a most preferred branch (strategy or
policy) can be identified. If the decision trees used here
are considered in the aggregate, the node probability
distributions become preference measure frequency distributions
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The respondents in this decision tree formulation are
presumed to find it easy to estimate cumulative preferences
along a branch but could not make reliable preference esti-
mates or predictions for nodes independent of the branch
context. The decision trees developed here retain the
properties of preference distribution at nodes in the
aggregate and endpoints of the trees represent preference
values under various policies (strategies). Risk of the
various policies is not assessed (or meaningful) during the
preference valuations, but it is accessible as a dispersion
measure of the various end-node aggregate preference
responses. The sequence of choices may be viewed as
chronological since the assessment questionnaire will
present them to the' respondent in order along each branch.
Most important, the decision tree formulation facilitates
expressing the various policy alternatives in a coherent
fashion.
The demand for services decision tree requires
thirty proportionality estimates by the respondent (a
patient) to assess his relative preferences for all
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The questionnaire would be a series of thirty-two
questions, tracing out each branch of the decision tree
shown above. A sample question, representing the assessment
made at (A 1 above would be:
5. Suppose dispensary visits could be made by appointment,
and your family had its choice among the physicians
available to deal with all of your family's general
medical care needs. What portion of your visits to a










tViNow denote the value of the j respondent's answer
to the first question as v. and the second as x~
.
; denote the
(decimal) values of the remaining answers x. . with i=l for
the third question and so on. Then use v. to weight the
answers to cause the actual questionnaire to approximate
each patient completing a hypothetical questionnaire prior
to each visit to a physician, asking for the probability of
utilizing a military medical care source instead of the
estimated cumulative realizations. Then for the i of the
sixteen policies (note that the policy at \ A l with no further
attributes is the same as the fourth endpoint from the top),
the weighted value of the j respondent's predicted
preference assessment Is v.x„.. If the questionnaire were




value for the i policy would be E-»
= t v . x . . . If a
representative or properly randomized sample of n patients
comprising s(100)# of the patients nearest a particular
military medical care facility is administered the question-
naire, and the total number of patient visits for the pre-
ceding quarter was v. , then 4v./s is an approximation of the
true value of E-i-n v -
x
Q . and the value of (4v. /sML
1?, v.xQ .)
could loosely be used as an approximate calibration factor
Am 1-
to apply to the i of the sixteen (renumbered) distinct
policy outcome predictions, 2.
=
. v.x. . . The unreliability
of this calibrated value to predict actual realized demand
response under the various policies will be discussed later.
A measure of dispersion of the preference assessments
could be obtained as follows:
Let c. . = (x. . - x„.) be the predicted change in the
proportion of annual number of visits to a military medical
care facility by memebers of the j respondent's family if
policy i is implemented;
let f. . be the sum of v. for responses under policy iIK J
which have the k value of c , .
.
ij
Let y, be these ordered values, with (for example) y = -1.0,
y ?
=
-0.75 and so on to y q = 1.0. Then the dispersion
9 2
measure would be Z^_ y f . Note that this is not a
variance estimate. It could be given the properties of a
9 2
variance estimate if it were multiplied by 1/(Z£ , f iu.)
and could properly be called the second central moment of




the i policy. It could even be calibrated; the calibrated
second central moment of proportional predicted preference
assessment change under the i policy alternative would be
«*VS > /JJ=1 V0j ))2(1/Ik=l fik )2 EiU *kflk •
For this to be considered a variance estimate, c . . would
ij
have to be considered a realization on a random variable.
The interpretation of utility assessments and changes in
them as random variables is considered irrelevant by some
[in Raiffa, 1968, the argument is offered that the distribu-
tions need not be considered and only the expected values are
relevant to ultimate choices] but valid by others [as discussed
in Barnett, 1973]. The fact remains that if it is a variance
estimate, it is only the estimated variance of an assessment
of future preference and then only if the calibrated pre-
ference assessment statistic is chosen so that the estimate
of the mean is
«v,)^=i voj> (i/£k=i w E;U Vik
The usefulness of this dispersion measure is only relative:
if its value is larger for one policy than another, it would
indicate that the assessment for that policy is less certain
in the aggregate. Again, these assessments are implicitly
of preferences or utilities, and they should not be
interpreted as quantitative behavioral predictions.
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2. Preference Predictions In Supply of Services
Conceptually, the assessment of pnysician preference
for various policies proceeds similarly, although no indirect
probability assessment can be made since choice in propor-
tionality is not possible. The usual (decision-theoretic)
procedure would be to convert each choice into a monetary
equivalent (i.e., "I would remain in military medical service
under the present policy if I were given am annual bonus of
$ ."; "I would remain in military mediical service if
I were offered the opportunity for a residency in my choice
of specialty and an annual bonus of $ ."; and so on).
In this policy selection procedure the monetary equivalent
methods of assessment are avoided for the following reason:
the supply subsystem can be considered as a two sector re-
source allocation model, physicians and tfoe Bureau of Medi-
cine and Surgery. If a change in policy ((which results in
retention of physicians who would otherwise leave military
medical service) results in a utility gain for one sector
(Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, due to increased retention)
and a utility loss for another sector (the physicians who
were retained by the policy change) and the gainers can
compensate the losers so that net gain in utility to both is
positive, the welfare of the system as a whole is increased.
Aside from the difficulty of ascribing to the Bureau of
Medicine and Surgery a marginal utility of money, and the
resultant difficulty in deciding if this system's welfare is
even relevant to the original objectives, the underlying
^3

qualification usually made to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion
[Winch, 1971] is applicable: there must be a reasonable
likelihood, as perceived by each sector, that compensation
will actually be made, in order for the resulting preference
assessments to have any validity. A military physician
intending to leave the service would be unlikely to place an
accurate monetary valuation on his lack of desire to remain
in military service simply because he has no expectation of
actually being offered such an extra monetary inducement to
retention. (The monetary valuation would be considered
accurate if the individual would actually accept it or more
and remain in military service if it were actually offered;
and he would actually refuse an offer of any less as an
inducement to remain in military service^ and then would
actually leave military service as originally planned.) In
fact, under present circumstances, the only way to make such
an assessment would be to gain authorization to make such
payments and actually pay the bonuses (and contract to offer
various of the policy alternatives) to some representative
sample of physicians considering leaving military service.
The policy attribute "remuneration" was Included (among other
reasons) in order to determine how often pay is a major
factor In military physician retention.
The physician accession and retention decision tree
has eight nodal regions v/ith only ^9 degenerate branch
segments; thus there are 1^*4 endpoints and 207 questions.
(The degeneracies include: the impossibility of instituting
ljl|

Family Practice medicine without continuity of care; it is
redundant to desire both Family Practice residency and other
specialty training; and the requirement to work in a primary
care capacity part of the time is irrelevant to a physician
desiring to enter Family Practice.) To formulate a question-
naire exhausting all of the relevant attribute combinations
would be unwieldy at best. The decision tree is not repre-
sented because of its very large size. Instead of evaluating
each node the respondent would be asked to formulate his own
policies of choice. Two questionnaires are required: one
for prospective accessions to military medical service, and
the other for those in military service who have not committed
themselves to remaining in the service. The differences are,
for those not in military service, the relevant features of
the present system (including freedom of practice, pay
comparability, likely duty stations, working hours and work-
load, administrative workload and comparability as well as
the remainder of the attributes listed. The questionnaire
could look like:
A. Do you plan to remain in (enter) military medical
service?
I—I 1. yes 2. no 3. undecided
B. If not or undecided, which one of the following
I—I is the major reason?
1. inadequate pay
2. Unable to settle my family permanently in the
area of my choice
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3. Being required to practice in primary care
capacity some of the time
4
.
Excessive workload, especially off-hours patient
calls
5. I plan to remain in the service
6. Other (specify)
C. Which two of the first four (or last) do you consider
f—* most important?
D. Which of the first four reasons for leaving military
I
—
' medical service do you consider to be least important?
E. Given the present pay structure, rotation system,
LJ workload and hours, and primary care responsibilities,
which one of the following would be most likely to
induce you to remain in (enter) military medical
service?
1. Opportunity for residency and practice in Family
Practice Medicine
2. Opportunity for residency in a specialty other
than Family Practice
3. Establishment of permanent patient assignment,
enabling continuity of care and an appointment
system
4. Participation in a preventive medicine program
for service members and dependents
5. I plan to leave (not to enter) military medical
service regardless




F. Which two of the above would most likely induce you
I—I to remain in (enter) military medical service?
I I (Enter the same number in both boxes if response 5.
or 6. is selected.)
G. Which three of the above would most likely induce
LJ you to remain in (enter) military medical service?
LJ (Enter the same number in all three boxes if response
I I 5. or 6. is selected.)
H. Would all of the first four induce you to remain in
|
I
(enter) military medical service?
1. yes 2. no 3. undecided
Summary data would then consist in the rankings of responses
under B., C, and D., and the ranking of responses under E.,
F., and G., for those respondents who indicated intention to
leave (not enter) military medical service (or undecided) on
question A., then calibrating by checking retention rate
indicated under A. against recent retention rate. (For
accessions, check against accessions to all services.) A
two-way preference lattice can then be formulated, with









As a side issue (except for the response 4. under B.) a








Note that the retention summary data can be simplified,
by counting the total number of occurrences of each of the
numbers 1. through 4. under questions E., P., and G. from
respondents who did not answer "yes" to question A. The
two-way chart's value is in comparing for effects of non-
independence of attributes (as Keeney [19691 does mathe-
matically in a slightly different context); in particular,
except for the mutual exclusiveness of responses 1. and 2.
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It is expected for any combination of attributes not
including the single most preferred attribute to be chosen
less often than the same number of attributes including
the single most preferred attribute.
The category "other" is included solely to avoid
the appearance of dictating to the respondent which sources
of dissatisfaction he may have. Although the fourth attribute
under B. (excessive workload) is not directly included in
the policy assessment model, its relative value in decreasing
retention is significant to overall policy choice because of
its relevance to the "off-hours availability of a physician"
attribute to preference predictions in demand for services;
any consideration of policies that are based on patient
preference for off-hours availability of a physician should
explicitly consider the feasibility of maintaining services
demanded if physician response indicates that workload and
hours is a significant decrement to retention.
Again it must be remembered that the calibrated
numbers calculated do not represent good estimates of
retention or accession rates that would be achieved after
implementation of the various policies; the underlying
principle employed is still prediction of preference or
utility.
Any measures of dispersion or other statistics
within each policy group of equal numbers of attributes
would not be especially useful because the random variable
underlying is one of discrete order only. Order statistics
^9

of discrete finite random variables can foe developed
(usually from an equally likely hypothesis rather than a
Bayesian prior), but they are not particularly powerful.
(An interesting development of this sort of analysis has
been made by T. D. Burnett and D. R. Barr of the Naval
Postgraduate School in an unpublished paper entitled, "A
Nonparametric Analogy of Analysis of Covariance . " ) About as
much useful information as the statistical analysis could
provide (perhaps more) is available in the two pictorial
representations of retention incentive rankings or in
corresponding tables of values with numbers of attributes
as the column index, order rank as row index, and preference
predictions in retention change as cell entries. Of course
separate representations for retention and accession would
have to be prepared for consideration.
C. MODELS FOR COMPARISON OF POLICY ALTERNATIVES
1. The Perfect and Continuous Inforaation Model
Suppose that each of the five demand attributes, the
corresponding four supply attributes, and the remaining four
supply attributes could be implemented at any level (from
none to total) and that time, resources, and techniques
allowed perfectly continuous, consistent, and complete
preference assessments of all levels of all appropriate
combinations of the attributes . Suppose further that it
was possible to calibrate each in such a. way that equal
proportions of supply and demand increase would allow the
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system to operate at the same patient visit per day per
physician ratios as now obtain (hopefully with better
effect, with reallocation of physicians to primary care
positions). The preference (utility) map -would then be a
nine-dimension hyperspace with hypersurfaces of equal supply
and distinct hypersurfaces of equal demand. Alternately,
it could be represented as a ten-dimensioni hyperspace with
the tenth axis as a common supply and demand increment axis.
Naturally projections of the supply hyperplane onto sub-
spaces including only demand variables would appear as a
constant and conversely for projections of demand onto
supply subspace; and because of lack of independence between
some of the attributes (as discussed earlier) some of the
axis hyperplanes may be vacant. Nevertheless, because each
attribute is simple (i.e. its utility is either strictly
nonincreasing or nondecreasing with quantity, and the
nonincreasing attributes can be converted to nondecreasing
ones by appropriate complementation) the surfaces will both
be at least quasi-concave with respect to the various half-
lines, quadrants, octants, etc. although it is not guaranteed
in the full space. Note that this condition does not
guarantee that any of the surfaces will intersect anywhere.
Now include the variability of response due to aggregation
(also perfectly and continuously described) . The surfaces
become regions of preference density with the expected values
forming the surfaces. The regions will have a (hyper-)
volume of intersection with probability 1 . Any point in a
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region of Intersection then represents feasibility (supply
and demand realizations will be equal) with some finite
probability. Referring to the earlier discussion of supply
and demand of services where feasible equilibrium conditions
were achievable both from increased and decreased supply
conditions with respect to the existing system, a positive
probability of feasibility is expected almost everywhere in
the perfect and continuous information space. The problem
remains to find optimal feasibility. Unfortunately the cost
of assessing reasonably good approximations of this continuous
information model would be enormous. Each respondent would
be required to answer hundreds, perhaps thousands of questions;
and the sheer size of the questionnaire would discourage
thoughtful replies. Further, the additional time required to
perform such an assessment over a representative sample of
respondents would give rise to confounding with time-
dependent uncontrolled variables between responses early in
the survey effort and those completed later.
It is tempting to try to formulate all of these
models in terms of a higher dimension Edgeworth box model
since overall considerations of the problem include alloca-
tion of resources between two sectors of a system, preference
maximization of two communities, and so on.
The Edgeworth box is used to show the effect on
sector utility and total welfare of various divisions of
resources (utility attributes) between the sectors. Here,
the sectors do not have identifiable utility aggregates;
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the allocation of resources here is an effect , not a cause
of various utility (preference) changes. Implicitly in
Edgeworth box terms, the present problem is an attempt to
change the allocation of resources by increasing the utility
gained in aggregate by principals who can Identify with
either sector; the more users in a particular sector, the
more utility attributable to that sector. Thus the Edgeworth
box mechanisms still obtain (Kaldor-Hicks (criterion, theory
of second-best) but in an indirect way.
2. The Actual Information Model
The information actually obtainable using the assess-
ment questionnaires may be represented as an irregular lattice
in the hyperspaces discussed, with the polmts lying somewhere
near the expected value hypersurfaces . Each sub-orthant and
each axis hyperplane would contain at most one supply and one
expected demand point. (Of course each policy under demand
assessment was represented by as many as 9 points depending
on the statistic chosen) . It would be unreasonable to expect
that any pair of supply and expected demand points would be
collocated; further, since supply and demand are aggregate
preference predictions under different subjective time
scales, revocability conditions, and points of view, colloca-
tion or even close proximity would not be conclusive of
optimum, or even representative of final equilibrium under
the appropriate attribute vector implementation.
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3. Reduction In Dimension
The data summaries shown in the future preference
assessment discussion represent various projections and
vacant sub-orthant omissions. In the case of the supply
assessment, the values of projections to the supply change
axis in the ten-dimension model are variously shown by order
of magnitude among those of equal numbers of attributes
(i.e. the vector (OOOlOlOlOx) has the same number of attri-
butes as the vector (OOOlOOllOx) with "0" representing attri-
bute exclusion, "1" indicating attribute inclusion and "x"
indicating the preference value) and by order of magnitude
among the largest of the equi-attribute vectors. The expected
values of demand vectors are represented similarly. Given
the imperfections and limitations of data, and the difficulty
of visualization in hyperspace, the summary data are felt
to be as meaningful as the full rank model.
4. Optimization
Clearly, two functions cannot be simultaneously
maximized [Hillier and Lieberman, 1967; Hadley, 1962; Hadley,
1964; Karlin, 1959]; that is, the problem statement
maximize: A
subject to: maximize B
and: A > A , B > B
— o' — o
(where A , B represent present conditions) has no solution.
However, if the appropriate convexity conditions obtain, and
the objectives are reasonably tractable, a search procedure
using each intermediate constraint as the subsequent objective
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and each intermediate objective value as the subsequent
constraint, might be successful. In the perfect and
continuous information model already discussed (the ten-
dimension case) where no guarantee of strict feasibility in
expectation was given, a modified penalty method might be
appropriate, searching alternately along the supply and
demand surfaces with some negative function of the distance
from the supply surface to the demand surface along the
increase in supply and demand axis as the penalty function.
This procedure implies (loosely) use of the theory of the
second best [Winch, 1971] in that the penalty function is
chosen (ideally) so that although neither supply nor demand
can be selected at optimum (maximum increase), they will be
chosen where the equilibrium after policy Implementation
will result in maximum wlfare (minimum USHBP costs). In the
actual information model, the total number of points to be
examined is small enough that they could simply be listed in
order of supply increase magnitude and a policy among the
best few could be selected according to some estimate of
feasibility using the relative preference order of the
corresponding demand policy as a guide.
An example of "first-best in expected value" (in
contrast to second best optima) would be where an optimal
attribute vector in the full space would Include the optimal
(best) vector In the subspace of supply attributes and the
optimal vector in the subspace of demand attributes. This
would require four of the components of each of the subvectors
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corresponding to the common attributes to be identical in
value. While this hypothetical outcome is certainly possible,
especially in the actual information model, its occurrence
is not so likely that a general optimization procedure could
include it as a solution requirement. Again, a more general
solution procedure must accept solutions of a second-best
(in expectation) nature.
In comparing search procedures in the continuous
model and the search among points here, it is seen that the
continuous model search is guaranteed only to find local
optima; and the choice of penalty will determine how "local"
rejected optima will be. Thus the optima selected would be
very sensitive to penalty selection. The actual information
model search amounts to selection among locally optimal
points in each of the various-dimensioned subspaces including
one in the full space. Thus the search in the continuous
model would be better at finding precise local optima but
the selection among points in the actual information model
would be better at finding a global optimum if it is assumed
that the points available are reasonably representative of
local optima.
5 . Practical Solution Procedures
The summary data for preference predictions suggested
consisted in proportional predicted preference changes in
demand under each relevant policy (along with a dispersion
measure under the policy) and a two-way ranking of proportional
predicted preference changes in supply. It was suggested
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above that policy choice be based on supply predicted pre-
ference ranking with some sort of loose (intuitive) constraint
being supplied by requiring that the corresponding demand
predicted preference be more than minimal. This is obviously
not a consistent decision rule (that is, different decision-
makers could choose different policies under this rule).
It is at this point that the decision-maker (the level of
command in the military medical community which possesses
the authority to implement the policies) considers other
factors that would result from the policy implementation:
short range costs; long range costs; long range effects in
limiting future alternative courses of action; and so on.
Of course it is prior to this point where such issues as
considering the retention effects of "workload" and the
patient preference for "off-hours physician availability"
attributes are weighed.
6. Interpretations and Limitations
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the measures
predicting future demand preference (patient demand for pri-
mary care services) are not expected to be cardinally meaning-
ful as quantitative predictors of patient choice behavior,
even after calibration. Their significance lies in the
reliability of their ranking by magnitude: a higher magni-
tude in preference prediction indicates a higher level of
utilization behavior if the related policy is Implemented.
Similarly, measures predicting future supply preference are
only meaningful as predictors of relative effectiveness of
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the various policies in increasing physician accession and
retention.
, The first two positive policy attributes listed
under preference predictions In supply of services (oppor-
tunity for residency and assignment in Family Practice medi-
cine; opportunity for residency in a specialty other than
Family Practice medicine) are mutually exclusive insofar as
the respondent is concerned but not insofar as the decision-
maker is; although the differences in response can indicate
some degree of preference for one or the other, the decision-
maker is probably in a position where he can provide both
according to the desires and capabilities of the individual
respondent. In this case data could be re-summarized, with
only three attributes considered instead of four:
(#1 or #2); (#3); (#4) .
It is possible that stronger indicated preference for such
a combined policy would result, assisting the decision-maker
in defining a clearer choice. As a check, the responses
to question H. should have about the same value as the
combined preferences for the re summarized data above.
The five negative policy attributes listed under
preference predictions in supply of services (remuneration;
choice and stability of domicile; part time assignment in
a primary care role; excessive workload; other) have not
been discussed (except for the relevance of the "excessive
workload" measure) because they are not considered variable
attributes (at least under the authority of the Chief of
c 8

Medicine and Surgery). Although the last-named attribute,
"other" should be examined for otherwise unsuspected attri-
butes to decrements in retention it could not be included in
the full rank model because of its vagueness; as previously
mentioned it was included primarily to improve the
palatability of the questionnaire.
These negative and mostly invariable negative policy
attributes were included for two reasons: first it is felt
that a military respondent would greet any retention ques-
tionnaire that did not mention pay and changes of station
with great suspicion; second, they could provide an addi-
tional data resource in the event policy alternatives rele-
vant to them were discussed at levels of authority above
the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
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V. IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOMES
A. IMPLEMENTATION
1. Timeliness of Data
It is fully expected that the results of a study
such as Is outlined here would be valid only for a relatively
short-range prediction. For this reason it is suggested that
such a study as is proposed be intended for selection of
policy implementation during no more than the following five
years . It would be appropriate to structure another study in
the intervening years for longer range planning purposes.
Locally designed variations to this sort of study could be
useful to individual regional medical centers from time to
time to select alternatives in local policy. A NRMC Data
Processing department could collect and compute the resultant
aggregated preferences and calculate the relevant values for






It is envisioned that any policy alternatives chosen
would be implemented gradually; even with the intention of
acting in great haste, an organization the size of the Navy's
Medical Community cannot reorganize immediately. Beloff [1967]>
Sloss [1968], and others suggest that an ideal base for
community (primary) health care is either the Family Practioner
or an Internist and Pediatrician. Thus as an interim measure
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the practicability of filling new primary care billets with
specialists in Internal Medicine, or Pediatricians is not
overlooked. (*)
3. Delays in Effects
Because of the different time scales and frequency
of choice that constitute patient and physician behavior,
quantitative data for verifying all aspects of behavior
response will not be available until several years after
implementation is effected. Although patient response may
be considered to be immediate because of immediacy of choice
available, it has been seen that patient choice behavior is
largely a response to the type and quantity of medical care
services offered. Thus only intermediate results in patient
choice behavior will be available during transition and
final patient behavior data will necessarily follow full
implementation of medical care supply policies. Fiscal year




1. Patient Demand for Services
This is actually a measure of the direct supply of
physician services. Nuisance variables are expected to
appear (season of year; pay raises; perturbations in rank
structure proportionalities; cost of living index; etc.).
Feldstein [1973] suggests that seasonal variation Is the
largest factor in fluctuations in demands for medical care
services. Since the objective v/as to reduce the proportion
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of CHAMPUS utilization in USHBP in favor of increased
utilization of the military medical sector, the appropriate
statistics could be:
number of military medical services in unit time
number of CHAMPUS services in unit time
and
cost of military medical services in unit time
cost of CHAMPUS services in unit time
The primary motivation for using the ratio (or, if preferred,
the inverse) is to suppress the effects of seasonal varia-
tion. An appropriate procedure would be to regress the
monthly statistics above against time and other appropriate
nuisance variables for the year before and the year after
implementation; use the regression coefficients in the
"before" case to predict values of the statistics chosen
during the "after" time period; then use covariance analysis
to test for significant differences in predicted values
under "no change" conditions and the actual post-implementation
values. The alternative hypothesis would be that the statistic
under policy implementation is larger than the "no change"
prediction. [Johnston, 1972]
2 . Physician Supply of Services
The statistics desired concern physician accession
and retention in response to policy changes. Because of the
delays that will be encountered before changes in policy can
have a measurable effect, it might be useful to conduct a
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post-Implementation preference assessment. Pre- and post-
implementation preference assessments of the same individuals
may not be meaningful for the following reasons:
(a). Changed circumstances, including entry or
departure from military service.
(b). Seeing substantially the same questionnaire, the
Individual is likely to respond unpredictably: the effects
of being re-interviewed are likely to be confounded with
actual preference changes in unpredictable ways.
However, if a new questionnaire were formulated
specifically asking the respondent to compare his predicted
intentions with his actual intentions, the results might be
meaningful, at least in terms of the accuracy of the
preference prediction assessment methods. Actual behavioral
data consists in number of accessions and retention rate.
Note that if a large Family Practice residency program is
instituted, there is considerable likelihood of a surge in
accessions that would confound the effect of other policy
attributes. Thus reliable accession rate data would neces-
sarily span several years' time. For retention rate, there
are at least two relevant physician populations as In the
predicted preference assessment: the physicians in service
during policy implementation, and post-implementation
accessions. At least four to five years of data would be
required to estimate the actual behavior of the latter group
(although intent to remain in service or not Is usually
firmly established within a year or so of end pf active obligated

service date). The statistical procedures appropriate would
be similar to those for patient behavior except that the
seasonal fluctuations would tend to be the result of medical
school graduation date rather than weather changes, and
ratio data would not be necessary. Because of the smaller
data base an alternative method could be a hierarchical
design for analysis of variance. [Chapter 7, Kirk, 1968]
In post-implementation analyses of both supply and
demand outcomes, an assumption of normality would be
reasonable for the regressions, covariance analysis, and
analysis of variance, unless preliminary data examination
strongly indicates otherwise. The analyses themselves
would only indicate whether the policy implemented had had
statistically significant effect.
C. INDIRECT REALIZATIONS
If a particular policy is put into effect, the observed
behavior (reduction in CHAMPUS use, retention rate) could
classically be interpreted as outcomes on a prediction.
In this case, however, the difference between the prediction
and the subsequent behavior is that one is a predicted
preference for a not-yet experienced policy and the other is
the behavioral result based on preference established after
the implementation. Thus the prediction and outcome can be
viewed in a Bayeslan sense either as prior and posterior
behavior distributions (from the point of view of the
person expressing the behavior) or as prior and experimental
behavior (as viewed by an outside observer).
6i)

1. Revealing Change In Intentions
Because expressed intentions (preferences) and
behavior (choices) may not coincide it might be useful to
assess current preference after policy implementation.
Then the prior distribution is still the preference predic-
tion and the posterior distribution in the post-implementation
preference assessment; the sample or experiment is the
experience of policy implementation. To estimate the change
in attitude brought about by experiencing the policy imple-
mentation it would be necessary to invert the process used
to find the (Bayesian) posterior distribution in order to
estimate the sampling distribution. Although the sampling
distribution would be of intrinsic interest to investigate
the mechanisms of opinion formation, it is doubtful that the
sampling distribution estimated could be used to calibrate
preference predictions for different policies or circum-
stances than those actually encountered.
2
.
Revealing Intention Effects on Behavior
Either predicted intentions or post-implementation
intentions could be considered here; however a simple
calibration for estimating the differences between expressed
expected preference and actual mean behavior was described
under preference predictions in demand for services. If
the preference prediction is viewed as a prior distribution
and the immediate post-implementation behavior is viewed as
an experimental sample, and the two are combined to form a
posterior distribution predicting final (long-term) behavior
65

the implication is that the preference predictions are
persistent through policy implementation, and the sample
does not represent the final effects of the preference
predictions and that in the long run, behavior will have
some intermediate distribution. Investigation of this
would have some benefit, especially to determine if it is





The need to respond to increasing patient desire for
convenient and sympathetic primary medical care is not
contradicted by any information source consulted. Yet
implementing all of the policy attributes listed previously
might be unnecessary or have unforeseen obstacles or effects
The effects could be established by the study proposed (the
preference prediction assessments) and any obstacles are
more likely to appear if a study such as this makes policy
intentions quite obvious. In addition, the relative
simplicity of the methods suggested recommend their use on




As major policy changes are implemented, the likelihood
is substantial that other dissatisfactions and problems will
occur. The general procedures and formulations suggested
here should be useful to predict the relative effectiveness
of proposed solutions in other problems involving competing
system sectors with policy changes possible only in one
sector and active participants in the system not competing




American medical practice appears to be moving irre-
versibly toward increasing government control. The most
recent National Health Insurance proposal deleted direct
price and quality controls, but trends toward larger group
practices, the increasing proportion of physicians in
salaried positions, and the increasing acceptance and growth
of Health Maintenance Organizations create an increasing
incidence of control of cost and methods of medical practice.
The most violent objection to legislation authorizing
departures from entrepreneurial medical practice have come
from within the medical profession. Threats of boycott and
worse were received when group practices were given
authorizing legislation decades ago, and were particularly
violent at the time of the original Medicare legislation.
Yet the concepts of group practice are strongly supported
now, Health Maintenance Organizations are gaining acceptance,
and majority medical profession support was forthcoming
within six months of the effective date of the legislation.
In each case, it was observed that the legislative enable-
ments or institutions did not change individual medical
practice significantly (except perhaps to assist in stabilizing
physician income); there was popular (non-medical) support for
each program; the programs or enablements were nation-wide.
[Colombotos, 1969] It is therefore reasonable to expect that
present trends will continue to meet with resistance from the
medical profession, and that they will be well accepted If
implemented in a thoughtful manner.
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Arguments are offered that insufficient inducements
will be available to bright students to enter medical school
if increases in government control continue. [Lear, in
Evang, Murray, and Lear, 1963] Yet the so-called "Doctor
drain" in Great Britain, cited as an example of dire effects
of institutionalized medical practice, has decreased steadily
since 1951 and medical school applicants have not decreased
in number. [Murray, in Evang, Murray, and Lear, 1963]
Overuse of medical care facilities is cited as a certain
and undesirable effect of one or another competing forms of
institutionalized medicine because of the negligible
marginal cost of occasions of service to the patient. Yet
the utilization of facilities in the United States (under
fee-for-service practice) is about the same as in Great
Britain (essentially free services) and is less than in
Sweden (which offers free hospitalization but requires
proportional co-payments for outpatient care services).
It could be safely concluded that the institutional form
alone does not determine utilization rate. [Anderson, 1963]
In the near future military medical systems can be
expected to evolve into forms resembling the large Health
Maintenance Organizations such as Kaiser-Permanente, while
civilian practice at large will come to resemble more and
more the CHAMPUS system. It appears that both patients and
physicians favor third-party (CHAMPUS-type) systems as
presently constituted. The difficulties now encountered
in third-party systems are increasing costs and the
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bureaucratic problems in attempting to hold those costs
down. If ways can be found to attract patients away from
CHAMPUS sources and into military medical care facilities,
and to retain reasonable numbers of physicians at the same
time, they will represent a reasonable example of a solution
to the acute problem of system response to consumer demand
that has heretofore accelerated cost rises and general
dissatisfaction with American medical practice. [Garfield,
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